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Trespassory Union Picketing on Private Property:
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters-Bringing State
Law to "No-Man's Land"?
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the location of a picket line has become almost
as important as the reason behind the protest. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the split among the states on the question of
whether trespassory union picketing' on management's private
property is actually 2 or "arguably"3 protected or prohibited by
section 74 or section 85 of the National Labor Relations Act
1. The term 'trespassory union picketing" is used herein to refer to peaceful
picketing by labor union members on non-public areas in violation of state tres-
pass laws. Not all picketing on an employer's private property can be enjoined
even if done against the owner's wishes. "[Elmployees often have the right to en-
gage in picketing at particular locations, including the private property of an-
other." Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 1770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. "When it is clear or may be fairly assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enact-
ment requires that state jurisdiction must yield." San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (emphasis added).
3. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7, or § 8 of the Act, the states as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to
be averted." Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
4. Section 7 provides, in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... "
National Labor Relations Act, § 7 as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
5. Section 8(a) (1) provides, in part- "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1976). Section
8(b) (4) (D) provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization or its agents:
[Tbo threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where ... an object thereof is...
forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employ-
ees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class
rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
(NLRA).6 While such labor activity was deemed to be within the
exclusive jurisdiction7 of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB)8 by some courts,9 other states found no pre-emption of
their trespass laws by the federal Act.10 With its latest venture
into this "no-man's land,"1 ' the United States Supreme Court has
attempted to fashion a partial answer to management's dilemma
when confronted with trespassory union picketing.
In Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council
of Carpenters12 the Court held that the NLRA did not pre-empt a
state court's jurisdiction over trespassory picketing by non-em-
ployee union members in situations where the union did not file
an unfair labor practices grievance13 with the NLRB. This note
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an or-
der or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative
for employees performing such work.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (D) (1976). Section 8(b) (7) (C) provides, in part, that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents:
[T]o picket.., any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requir-
ing an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees... unless such labor organization is cur-
rently certified as the representative of such employees:
. where such picketing has been conducted without a petition... [for
a representation election] being filed within a reasonable period of time
not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (1976).
6. Labor Management Relations Act § 1 et seq. as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq. (1976).
7. The terms "exclusive" or "primary" jurisdiction refer to the Court's deter-
mination in Garmon that the NLRA "completely pre-empts state court jurisdiction
unless the [National Labor Relations] Board determines that the disputed con-
duct is neither protected nor prohibited by the Federal Act." Sears, Roebuck and
Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 1758-59
(1978).
8. The Board was created in 1947 to carry out the provisions of the NLRA.
National Labor Relations Act § 3 as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
9. E.g., Shirley v. Retail Store Employees Union, 22 Kan. 373, 565 P.2d 585
(1977); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 17 Cal.3d 873, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), rev'd., 98 S. Ct.
1745 (1978); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1207, 58 Wash.2d 426, 363 P.2d
803 (1961); see also Schachter, Regulating Trespasses on Private Property: State In-
junctive Relief Is the Answer, 28 LABOR LAW JouRNAL 211, 213-16 (1977); Note, 5
PEPPERDIN L. REV. 153, 160 (1977).
10. E.g., May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743, 64
1ll.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832 (1976); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766
(1964); see also Schachter, supra note 9; Note, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 153, 160 (1977).
11. The Court first labelled this area of the law a "no-man's land" in Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 11 (1957). Cf. Chief Justice Burger's refer-
ence to a "no-law area." Taggert v. Weinacker's Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 228 (1970) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring).
12. 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
13. The investigation of an alleged violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is initiated by the filing of a charge, which must be in writing
and signed, and must either be notarized or must contain a declaration by
the person signing it, under the penalties of the Criminal Code, that its
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will examine the pre-emption issues raised by Sears, Roebuck
and discuss whether the decision is destined to be narrowly con-
strued according to its restrictive set of facts, or whether the
Court has begun to usurp the NLRB's primary authority over la-
bor controversies by allowing an application of state trespass laws
in this "no-man's land."
IL FACTS OF THE CASE
In October of 1973 the San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters (Union) learned that Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Sears)
was having carpentry work done in its Chula Vista, California de-
partment store. Two business representatives of the Union vis-
ited the location and found non-Union dispatched carpenters
performing the labor. The representatives met with the manager
of the store and asked him to honor the terms of a master agree-
ment between the Union and the Building Trades Council of San
Diego (which required the exclusive use of Union-dispatched
carpenters for the type of work Sears was having done), or to sub-
contract the work to a contractor who would do so. Upon the
store manager's failure to meet the Union's demands, Union-sanc-
tioned picketing of the department store began.14
The picketing was peaceful and orderly at all times1 5 and, al-
though conducted on Sears' private property, the patrolling was
conducted in areas where the store had previously allowed vari-
ous groups to solicit and to distribute literature.16
After the Union refused to comply with Sears' demand to re-
move the pickets from store property, Sears obtained a temporary
restraining order from the Superior Court of San Diego County.
contents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. The
charge is filed with the regional director for the region in which the al-
leged violations have occurred or are occurring. A blank form for filing
such charge is supplied by the regional office upon request. The charge
contains the name and address of the person against whom the charge is
made and a statement of facts constituting the alleged unfair labor prac-
tices.
NLRB Statements of Procedure 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1972).
14. Sears has an "open shop"; i.e., there are no union employees working for
the company. Consequently, the picketing was done entirely by non-Sears per-
sonnel.
15. Had the picketing been violent or raised the threat of violence the state
courts could unquestionably halt the Union's activity. See Automobile Workers v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (violence); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum
Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (threats of violence).
16. 98 S. Ct. at 1772 n.11.
The order enjoined the pickets from patrolling on the non-public
areas belonging to the department store.17 The Union immedi-
ately withdrew its pickets to the public sidewalks surrounding the
Sears' parking lot. There the pickets continued their patrolling
until the Union decided that they were having little impact so
great a distance from the store.18 Thereafter, the superior court
granted a preliminary injunction against further Union patrols on
Sears' private property. The injunction did not, however, pre-
clude the Union from picketing on the public sidewalks surround-
ing the store.19
California's Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the supe-
rior court's order.20 Relying on an exception to the pre-emption
doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,21 the court of appeal
ruled that the Union-sanctioned picketing affected Sears' private
property rights, an area "deeply rooted in local feeling and re-
sponsibility."22 The court held that, in the absence of clearly ex-
pressed congressional intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction,23 the
continuing trespass could be enjoined.
The California Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the re-
straining order.24 The court declared that state jurisdiction was
pre-empted by the NLRA because the picketing was both argua-
bly prohibited under section 8 of the Act as unlawful recogni-
tional picketing,25 and arguably protected by section 7 of the Act
as picketing to enforce area standards for the employment of
carpenters.26
17. Id. at 1750.
18. Contrary to the Union's contention, Sears claimed that some delivery and
repairmen refused to cross the picket line on the public sidewalk. 98 S. Ct. at 1750
n.2.
19. Id. at 1750.
20. 52 Cal. App.3d 690, 125 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1975).
21. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon the Court reversed a California court's
award of damages against a union which had engaged in tortious conduct in viola-
tion of state law. The Court found the union's activity "arguably" within the
scope of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA and thus pre-empted the state court's decision.
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1750, quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
23. Id.
24. Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 17 Cal.3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), rev'd., 98 S. Ct.
1745 (1978).
25. "Recognitional picketing" is an attempt by a union to cause an employer
"to recognize or bargain with" that union and to compel the employer to make
concessions or modifications in its personnel decisions. See GORMAN, BASIC TEXT
ON LABOR LAw 225 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN]. Section 8(b)(7)(C) of
the NLRA requires that a petition for representation be fied within 30 days of the
start of recognitional picketing. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (1976).
26. Picketing to enforce area standards is a union measure to pressure man-
agement into improving "substandard" economic or working conditions, or to pre-
272
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The court distinguished the holdings by courts of other states27
which found no pre-emption of state trespass laws by the
NLRA,28 and instead chose to follow its previous holding in Musi-
cians Union Local No. 6 v. Superior Court29 where it stated that,
in the absence of some danger to public health or safety, state
courts were without jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing,
whether trespassory or nontrespassory. 30 The California
Supreme Court found no such danger in Sears, Roebuck.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
On May 15, 1978 the California Supreme Court's judgment was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in a plurality opin-
ion written by Mr. Justice Stevens. 31 The Court addressed the
question left unanswered in a previous decision:32 whether the
NLRA pre-empted state jurisdiction over trespassory union pick-
eting which was arguably protected or prohibited by the federal
Act.
The plurality's five-part decision first examined the "arguably
prohibited" finding of the California Supreme Court. Though the
Union-sanctioned picketing was arguably prohibited by section 8,
wrote Justice Stevens, the controversy presented to the San Di-
ego Superior Court was the location of the picketing, not whether
the objectives of the protest were unlawful.33 Thus, the superior
court's enforcement of a state trespass law did not give rise to a
realistic threat of state interference with the NLRB's primary ju-
risdiction.
If Sears had filed a charge, the federal issue would have been whether the
picketing had a recognitional or work reassignment objective .... Con-
versely, in the state action, Sears only challenged the location of the pick-
eting; whether the picketing had an objective prescribed by federal law
was irrelevant to the state claim.34
Perhaps even more significantly, however, the Court was un-
able to find sufficient justification for federal pre-emption in the
vent the employer from undermining area employment standards by maintaining
low personnel or labor requirements. See GORMAN, supra note 25, at 225-26.
27. See generally note 10 supra.
28. 17 Cal.3d at 906 n.8, 553 P.2d at 613 n.8, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.8.
29. 69 Cal.2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968).
30. 17 Cal.3d at 903, 553 P.2d at 611, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
31. 98 S. Ct. 1750.
32. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
33. 98 S. Ct. at 1758.
34. Id.
"arguably protected" nature of the picketing. Noting that the
Union's failure to go to the NLRB after Sears had ordered the
pickets from its private property left the department store with-
out a Board remedy,35 the Court carved out a new exception to
the Board's primary jurisdiction:
We are therefore persuaded that the primary jurisdiction rationale does
not provide a sufficient justification for pre-empting state jurisdiction over
arguably protected conduct when the party who could have presented the
protection issue to the Board has not done so and the other party to the
dispute has no acceptable means of doing so.36
The plurality recognized that to deny management a state rem-
edy in cases where the union refused to go to the Board would
force the private property owner to endure the trespass indefi-
nitely or to risk a violent confrontation by attempting to remove
the pickets himself.37 Thus, the Court fashioned a limited solu-
tion to this dilemma by enabling the landowner (management) to
seek state judicial intervention to determine whether the location,
but not the legitimacy of the picketing itself, violated state laws.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed with the
Court that Sears should be allowed a state remedy.38 He limited
his support, however, to situations where the Union has not filed
an unfair labor practice allegation with the NLRB.39
Though concurring with the plurality, Justice Powell disagreed
with Justice Blackmun in his separate opinion.40 Powell was not
impressed with the suggestion that the filing of a complaint with
the Board was a talisman that immediately pre-empted state ju-
risdiction.41 Stressing that 'no man's land' prevents all recourse
to the courts," and that it invited self-help measures, Justice Pow-
ell belittled any attempt to read into the NLRA any congressional
authorization for an employer to "endure the creation of a tempo-
rary easement" on his private property.4 2 Such an "easement"
would be even more difficult to accept in situations where, as in
Sears, Roebuck, non-employees were doing the picketing.
Justices Stewart and Marshall joined Justice Brennan in his
dissent.43 Calling the case a classic for pre-emption,4 4 Justice
Brennan minimized the effect the trespassory picketing had on
Sears. Since the Union's activity was arguably protected as ei-
35. Id. at 1760.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1763 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1764.
40. Id. at 1765 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1766.
43. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1772.
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ther area standards or recognitional picketing, the dissent argued
that the NLRA pre-empted state jurisdiction regardless of the
constraints placed on Sears.45
Furthermore, wrote Justice Brennan, "the denial to the em-
ployer of a remedy is an entirely acceptable social cost for the
benefits of a pre-emption rule that avoids the danger of state-
court interference with national labor policy."4 6 Nor, according to
the dissent, was Sears' interest in keeping the pickets off its pri-
vate walkways and on the public sidewalks a very strong one.
The picketing was confined to a portion of Sears' property which was open
to the public and on which Sears had permitted solicitations by other
groups. Thus, while Sears to be sure owned the property, it resembled
public property in many respects.
4 7
Labelling the decision an "unfortunate" one, Justice Brennan sug-
gested that adherence to the Garmon pre-emption tests4 8 would
help avoid much of the confusion and uncertainty that Sears,
Roebuck was sure to cause.49
IV. PRE-EMPTION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the two decades since Garmon5 0 was handed down, the
courts have repeatedly encountered pre-emption5 l of state action
45. Id. at 1773.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1772 (footnote omitted).
48. See notes 2 and 3 supra and accompanying text.
49. 98 S. Ct. at 1778.
50. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see note
21 supra.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;.., shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; ... any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding." (Emphasis added). Commonly referred to as
the Supremacy Clause, this section allows for the pre-emption of any state law
which conflicts with a federal law. However, the federal courts do not have an in-
herent power to enjoin state court preceedings seeking an injunction against pick-
eting merely because such proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or
invade an area pre-empted by federal law. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Loco-
motive Engineers, 63 Lab. Cas. 10,931 (1970). The action is permitted only where
it is necessary to aid in the federal court's jurisdiction or to protect its judgment.
Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)) and the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970)) were passed to protect organized
labor's efforts to bargain collectively. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 350 U.S. 270 (1955), reh. denied 351 U.S. 980 (1956); Note, 5 PEP-
PERDuvE L. REV. 153 n.2. Under these Acts, if the question before the courts con-
cerns NLRB jurisdiction against state court interference, the NLRB must initiate
the action. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Rickman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511
by the NLRB. A constant flux of judicial ideas has flooded the
law with inconsistent theories and approaches. 5 2 All, however,
have served to reinforce the basic premise that "the day of pre-
emption has come."53
Traditionally, two basic principles have grounded pre-emption
holdings.54 Any time there exists a potential conflict between
substantive provisions of federal and state law, the Court will
usually nullify the latter and uphold the former. Alternatively,
the existence of a potential conflict between state enforcement
groups and specialized federal agencies leads to an examination
by the Court of the designated purpose of each. This determina-
tion qualifies the agencies for either co-existence or results in pre-
clusion of state action by federal law. The NLRB is an
independent federal agency established under the NLRA.55
Therefore both principles may be applicable in examining the ju-
risdiction and authority of the Board, in light of state laws and
state agencies.
(1955); Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). See Cox, Labor Law Pre-
emption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Broomfield, Preemptive Federal
Jurisdiction over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REv. 552
(1970).
52. The Court does not merely set out black and white principles based upon
the existence of federal law, rather it examines the reason and necessity for state
action. See Farmer v. Carpenter, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977): "IT]he cases reflect a
balanced inquiry into such factors as the nature of the federal and state interests
in regulation and the potential for interference with federal regulation."
The state courts themselves are diversified in their approaches to granting in-
junctive relief. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Inc. v. Doe, 31 Lab. Cas. 70,324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1956) (picketing to compel breach of valid union contract); Metropolis Country
Club v. Lewis, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 620, 202 Misc. 368 (1952) (picketing which misleads the
public and compels an employer to force his workers to join a union); General Tel-
eradio Inc. v. Manuti, 133 N.Y.S.2d 362, 284 AD 400 (1954) (picketing violative of a
federal law other than the NLRA); Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union,
Local 301, 383 Pa. 547, 119 A.2d 199 (1956) (organizational picketing for unreasona-
ble period of time); Hearn Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Livingston, 125 N.Y.S.2d 187, 282 AD
480 (1953) (picketing where violence involved).
For areas in which state action was not taken, see Galler 7 Up Bottling Co. v.
Slurzberg, 27 N.J. Super. 139, 99 A.2d 164 (1953) (product picketing); Kidde Mfg.
Co. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers, Local 437, 27 N.J. Super. 183, 99
A.2d 210 (1953) (employer unlawfully withheld vacation pay).
53. Address by Stanley Schair, ABA National Institute on Developing Labor
Law, (March 1, 1977), reprinted in THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, ed. by Francis
Penn and Laurel Black (1978).
54. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
55. See notes 6 and 8 supra. Congress sought a means of uniformity and
therefore prescribed for the Board "a particular procedure for investigation, com-
plaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final
administrative order," thereby seeking "to obtain uniform application of its sub-
stantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies." Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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One school of thought maintains that the mere formation of the
NLRB is grounds for pre-emption of state regulation.5 6 However,
there exist certain exceptions to such an automatic preclusion of
a state's judicial and administrative powers.
[Blecause Congress has refrained from providing specific directions with
respect to the scope of pre-empted state regulation the Court has been un-
willing to declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns
in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers
and unions. 57
The first exception concerns the Court's inability to discern a
congressional intent to regulate the area. The primary judicial in-
terpretation of congressional intent in enacting the NLRA came in
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.58 Although the
decision held federal jurisdiction to be exclusive if the disputed
labor activity is or may "arguably" be covered under either sec-
tion 7 or section 8 of the NLRA,59 it also set out two areas in
which such pre-emption is to be questioned. If the activity in-
volved is either a matter of deep local concern 60 or a matter which
the Labor Management Relations Act 6 ' only peripherally
touches, 62 the congressional intent is not automatically evaluated
to preclude state action.
The second major exception concerns the regulation of criminal
or tortious violence, or the threat thereof.63 These activities must
be controlled on a local level to be effective. An employer cannot
wait several months for the Board to make a determination if his
person or property is under threat of harm.
The final exception in this area concerns the implementation of
a strong federal policy by state or federal courts, regardless of the
Board's jurisdiction. Actions to enforce collective bargaining
agreements exemplify federal policy, under the NLRA, which
must be upheld by the state courts.6
56. GoXmAN, supra note 25, at 768.
57. Farmers v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1977).
58. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
59. Id. at 244.
60. Id. at 247.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1976).
62. 359 U.S. at 243.
63. GORMAN, supra note 25, at 768.
64. Congress has created exceptions to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction in
addition to those developed by the judiciary. Section 303 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158, as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976), au-
thorizes anyone injured in his business or property by activity violative of Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 61 Stat. 140, as amended by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), to
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE DECIDED BY THE COURT
In Sears, Roebuck65 the Court addressed the issue of trespas-
sory picketing by non-employee Union members on Sears' private
property.66 Therein lie two crucial points of consideration: those
who were picketing were non-employees, and the location of the
picketing was on private property.
"Stranger picketing" 67 has consistently been justified on a first
amendment freedom of speech basis. 68 However, in Sears,
Roebuck, the Court weighed the interests of the property owner
against those of the Union, and found the comparative signifi-
cance of the latter's interests to be wanting. The injunction
granted by the state superior court did not prevent the Union
from picketing, but rather, it merely precluded the Union from pa-
trolling on Sears' private property.69 The court made no attempt
to determine the value of such picketing once it was removed
from the department store's doorstep.
The initial premise of the Supreme Court was that the "union's
picketing on Sears' property after the request to leave was a con-
recover damages in federal district court even though the underlying unfair labor
practices are remediable by the Board. See Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252
(1964). Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), authorizes suits for
breach of a collective-bargaining agreement even if the breach is an unfair labor
practice within the Board's jurisdiction. See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371
U.S. 195 (1962). Section 14(c)(2) of the NLRA, as added by Title VII, § 701(a) of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2)
(1976), permits state agencies and state courts to assert jurisdiction over "labor
disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion, to assert jurisdiction." Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 297.
65. 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978). This is the first time the Court has fully addressed
the subject of concerted trespass by organized labor. See Musicians Union Local
No. 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 695, 447 P.2d 313, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968) (NLRB
never invoked, injunction held improper under law of trespass or otherwise, as an
exercise of the power reserved to the states to insure public health or safety); Peo-
ple v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 NE.2d 832 (1976) (NLRB never invoked, held:
"where private property is involved, union rights under section 7 are limited and
must be made clear on its initiative in advance." Id. at 538, 349 N.E.2d at 838);
Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964); Moreland Corporation v. Re-
tail Store Employees Union Local No. 444, 16 Wis.2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962)
(held: states have jurisdiction to enjoin trespass, even assuming the presence of
the necessary federal jurisdictional requirements); Freeman v. Retail Clerks
Union Local No. 1207, 57 Wash.2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961) (action for trespass by a
shopping center owner against a labor union held arguably subject to NLRA, thus
depriving state court of subject matter jurisdiction).
66. 98 S. Ct. at 1758.
67. The term "stranger picketing" applies whenever non-employees are in-
volved.
68. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
69. 98 S. Ct. at 1746.
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tinuing trespass in violation of state law."70 At no time was there
an assertion that the picketing itself was illegal. However, if the
question had been before the Board, the legality, not the location,
would have been the primary issue addressed. The interests in-
volved must be carefully scrutinized because "the decision to pre-
empt..., state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must
depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted
and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of
permitting the state court to proceed."7 1
NLRB consideration 72 is invoked by the filing of an unfair labor
practices charge. Since Sears had no grounds upon which to file
a charge with the Board, and the Union chose not to do so, Sears
was left without a method of obtaining a ruling from the Board.
Sears had three options: 1) allow the picketing on their private
property; 2) forcefully evict the pickets; or 3) seek the protection
of the state trespass laws. The Court evaluated each of these and
concluded that Sears had only one viable alternative-to ask for
relief from the state courts.73
Historically, picketing has been protected, or arguably pro-
tected, by section 7 of the NLRA, as well as prohibited, or argua-
bly prohibited, as an unfair labor practice under section 8.74 Any
finding by the Board of actual protection of an activity results in
pre-emption of any state action.7 5 However, the title of "arguably
protected" grants to the Board primary jurisdiction to determine
such protection.76 Alternatively, the state court could be allowed
the task of making the determination, 77 but such an approach has
70. Id. at 1751. This was the first time since the passage of the Wagner Act in
1935 that the Court has attempted to decide "whether a state court has power to
enforce local trespass laws against a union's peaceful picketing." See Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1956); Cf. Taggert v.
Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So.2d 913 (1968), cert. granted 396 U.S. 813
(1969), cert dismissed 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
71. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
72. See notes 13 and 55 supra.
73. The Court noted that:
Since the Union's conduct violated state law, Sears legitimately rejected
the first option. Since the second option involved a risk of violence, Sears
surely had the right-perhaps the duty--to reject it. Only by proceeding
in state court, therefore, could Sears obtain an orderly resolution of the
question whether the Union had a federal right to remain on its property.
98 S. Ct. at 1760.
74. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
75. See note 2 supra.
76. See note 3 supra.
77. It is possible in areas of stranger picketing (see note 67 supra) that a rul-
been viewed by many as an inadequate means of protecting fed-
eral rights.78
In Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board79 the Court held
that a shopping center was private property and that no constitu-
tional right8O existed to picket there. However, the Court re-
manded to the Board for a determination of whether such a right
is statutorily protected under section 7 of the NLRA. The Court
was unwilling to allow the state court determination to stand
alone. The Board invoked a balancing test, as provided for in
Babcock v. Wilcox Co.,81 between the protected union activity
and the private property rights of the owner, and concluded that
the union had no other "reasonable access to the employer's cus-
tomers."8 2 In addition, the Board held that the infringement
upon the property rights of the owner, who was not a party to the
dispute, "did not strip the picketing of the statutory protection."83
The Court in Sears, Roebuck84 did not have the option to re-
mand to the NLRB for a determination of section 7 protections.
The Union had an opportunity to invoke the Board's opinion and
chose not to do so. The Court interpreted that action to be a ful-
fillment of any protection owed to the Union and upheld the state
court determination. In so doing it concluded that, in any event,
a "trespass is far more likely to be unprotected than protected."85
The Court examined the primary jurisdiction86 theory in light of
the "arguably protected" status of the picketing. In most in-
stances when the same controversy may be presented to the state
court or the NLRB, it must be presented to the Board. However,
this rationale does not extend to cases in which the employer has
no reasonably acceptable method of acquiring the jurisdiction of
the Board or inducing the Union to invoke such jurisdiction.87
Sears had no such means of acquiring a Board decision. Beyond
this, the issue which Sears asked the state court to decide would
ing by the Board will be unattainable. Therefore, some members of the Court
have urged that state action be pre-empted only when the activities are actually
protected. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White in Longshoremen's
Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
78. GoRmAN, supra note 25, at 770.
79. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). See W.S. Rudolph, Shopping Center Picketing: The Im-
pact of Hudgens v. NLRB, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812 (1977).
80. The constitutional right involved was the first amendment protection of
free speech.
81. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
82. [1977-78] NLRB Decisions (CCH) 118,290.
83. Id.
84. 98 S. Ct. 1745.
85. Id. at 1761.
86. See note 7 supra.
87. 98 S. Ct. at 1760.
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not have been reached by a Board decision.8 8
Unfair labor practices as prohibited under section 8 of the
NLRA entail activities concerning picketing.89 However, none of
the subsections reach the issue in this case. There was no at-
tempt by Sears to use either force or illegal means to disband the
picketing. Rather, it chose to use the only viable means of self-
help available-injunctive relief from the state courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no definitive statement to be found which delineates
what the Union hoped to accomplish in its stranger picketing of
Sears' open shop, beyond the pressuring of Sears to use Union
members. In a free enterprise system, the "shop-keeper" should
be free to run his own shop as he chooses. One method of ac-
complishing this is to avoid depriving the owner of the right to
control his own property.
Sears, Roebuck casts a glimmer of light into "no-man's land."
However, the overall effect of the case will be limited because the
decision itself was restricted to a particular set of facts: a non-
union shop being picketed on its own property by non-employees
to coerce the use of union members. In the future, therefore, it is
likely the Court will continue to apply the basic theories and to
balance the interests involved in picketing on private property un-




88. Id. at 1758.
89. Section 8(b) (7) (C); see note 5 supra and accompanying text.

